Guidelines for Testing for Anthrax
The purpose of these policy guidelines is to recommend procedures for handling potential biological threats of Anthrax exposure.
I. Testing
of Symptomatic Patients for Anthrax
Suspected anthrax cases should be reported immediately to
the local health department. The health department will provide assistance with
testing decisions and facilitate communication with ODH and CDC. Antigen
detection may be available through a reference laboratory or CDC. Nasal swabs
are not currently recommended for diagnosis of symptomatic patients.
II. Testing
of Asymptomatic Patients for Anthrax
There is no reliable clinical test for detection of anthrax
exposure in asymptomatic individuals. The use of nasal cultures (swabs) is NOT recommended and should be
discouraged. Nasal swabs will ONLY be done under the direction of government
agencies. A negative nasal culture does not rule out anthrax infection
or exposure. The hospital cannot process nasal swabs to rule out
anthrax.
Ill. Testing
Suspicious Items/Substances
The local law enforcement authorities and local health
departments handle all suspicious substances/items. The ODH laboratory
processes all suspicious substances/items. The hospital will not test or
accept these items in their laboratory.
|
|
DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES |
CULTURES* |
|
INHALATION ANTHRAX |
chest X-ray and/or chest CT peripheral blood smear gram stain of CSF** gram stain pleural/ascitic fluid |
blood CSF** pleural/ascitic fluid |
|
CUTANEOUS ANTHRAX |
gram stain of skin lesion gram stain of skin biopsy peripheral blood smear |
blood vesicular fluid sterile punch biopsy |
|
GASTROINTESTINAL ANTHRAX |
|
blood stool |
* sputum cultures and gram stains unlikely to
be diagnostic
**
if meningeal signs present
Lab
Due to potential risks associated with handling infectious
materials, laboratory testing should be the minimum necessary for diagnostic
evaluation and patient care. Laboratory specimens should be placed in plastic
bags that are sealed, and then transported in clearly labeled, durable,
leak-proof containers directly to the specimen handling area of the laboratory.
Care should be taken not to contaminate the external surfaces of the container.
Lab personnel should be notified of what they are handling. Bio-Safety Level 2
should be used for handling specimens.
SEND ALL SPECIMENS TO MICROBIOLOGY LAB; DO NOT USE TUBE
SYSTEM
|
Anthrax |
Blood Cultures: two separate sets from different
sites (one set is 2 bottles – 10 ml each bottle) |
Lavender Tube (EDTA) (for inpatients only) (or
direct gram stain) |
2 red-top or gold-top tubes (for PCR and acute
serology) |
Sputum |
Pleural fluid (if present) |
CSF (if meningeal signs present) |
Cutaneous Lesions: swabs X 2 and punch biopsies X 3
(see notes below) |
Stool (not in transport medium) |
Anterior Nares Swab |
ID Consult |
Note under comments on microbiology requisition |
|
Possible B. Anthracis |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Not applicable |
|
Anthrax – inhalational |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
R/O Anthrax |
|
Anthrax cutaneous – vesicular stage |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
See notes below |
No |
No |
Yes |
R/O Anthrax |
|
Anthrax cutaneous – eschar stage |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
See notes below |
No |
No |
Yes |
R/O Anthrax |
|
Anthrax – GI |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
|
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
R/O Anthrax |
Notes regarding cutaneous Lesions:
1.
Swabs
a.
Vesicular lesions – soak 2 swabs (1 culture swab) in
previously unopened vesicle fluid and send to micro lab
b.
Eschar lesions – rotate 2 swabs (1 culture swab) beneath
edge of eschar without removing eschar and send to micro lab
2.
Punch biopsies
a.
Send one is sterile saline for culture
b.
Send one in 10% formaline to be sent to CDC for
histopathology and immunohistochemical staining
c.
Send one in a sterile cup to be frozen and sent to CDC for
culture and PCR
References:
CDC Website
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/index.asp
Note: These are guidelines that have been developed with data
available as of 1/21/02.
Initially Prepared by
The Akron Regional Hospital
Association
Emergency Preparedness
Subcommittee
August 20, 2002